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Abstract A cap is imposed on the carbon tax rate if the total tax revenue is not allowed to
increase. Using recent data on the carbon-intensity of the economy and the overall tax take, I
show that this cap constrains almost any climate policy in at least some countries. A larger
number of countries, emitting a substantial share of global carbon dioxide, cannot fully
participate if the carbon tax (or equivalent alternative regulation) is high enough to meet the
2 °C target. For that target, the carbon tax revenue in 2020 is greater than 10 % of total tax
revenue in every country.
1 Introduction
There have been many calls for a sharp reduction of greenhouse gases. Economists have
called for high carbon taxes (Ackerman et al. 2010; Ayres and Walter 1991; Stern et al.
2006). (Weitzman 2009) even argues for an arbitrarily high carbon tax. This seems to be in
line with Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which
calls for emission reduction so as to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system”. However, Article 2 also has that “economic development [should] proceed
in a sustainable manner”. This paper puts a reasonable upper on the carbon tax in the short
run.
The maximum acceptable carbon tax is not known. In fact, the concept itself is undefined.
In a democracy, one could say that a carbon tax is unlikely to exceed the level that would
lead to a government defeat at the next elections. This would be hard to quantify. One can,
however, estimate the willingness to accept carbon taxes. The average European is prepared
to a carbon tax of $37/tC (Hersch and Viscusi 2006), 57 % of Australians are prepared to pay
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$79/tC or more (Carson et al. 2010), and the median Harvard student would pay $210/tC
(Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2006). In this paper, I take a different approach.
Assuming that climate policy will be implemented through fiscal measures, I compute the
maximum carbon tax that is budget neutral. I refer to this as the Leviathan tax (Hobbes
1651), as the state grows (relative to the rest of the economy) if the carbon tax would exceed
this rate. What would the carbon tax rate be if it were the only tax, and if total tax revenue is
kept constant? That is, what carbon tax would replace all other taxes? This obviously puts an
upper bound on the carbon tax. I show below that this is a meaningful upper bound.
One can argue that, as a carbon tax aims to reduce emissions and thus erode the tax base,
it would not be fiscally prudent to shift the entire tax burden onto greenhouse gas emissions.
One can argue that a prudent tax base is diverse (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976; Cremer et al.
2001). Those are valid arguments. They only sharpen the conclusions below.
One can also argue that climate policy is broader than taxation. Indeed, carbon taxes have
played a minor role in abatement policy. If subsidies were the policy instrument of choice,
total tax revenue imposes a constraint. If tradable permits are used, then the total tax take
provides a useful yardstick for the net amount that people and companies pay for permits.
And total tax revenue even provides a useful yardstick if greenhouse gas emissions are
reduced by direct regulation. There is a carbon tax that has the same impact on emissions as
any regulation—but the economic burden of that regulation is at least as high as that of the
equivalent carbon tax (Baumol 1972; Baumol and Oates 1971). Total tax revenue is thus a
meaningful upper bound for climate policy, regardless of its implementation.
On the other hand, many countries face acute deficits, while governments of other
countries rely, perhaps unwisely so, on revenue other than taxation or may be unable to
impose or enforce the desirable level of taxation. The Leviathan tax as defined here is
therefore not a true upper bound. Total tax revenue can increase, and may need to increase in
a number of countries.
This note proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents data and methods. Section 3 discusses
the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data and method
The method used is straightforward. Equate carbon tax revenue to total tax take, and solve
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where t is the carbon tax (in dollars per tonne of carbon dioxide), M is carbon dioxide
emissions (in tonnes per year), τ is total tax take (in per cent), and Y is gross domestic
product (in dollars per year).
The Leviathan carbon tax t* is then equal to the tax take τ times the inverse of the carbon
intensity of the economy M/Y.
Over time, a carbon tax would reduce emissions. Because the carbon tax replaces all other
taxes (including import tariffs), there would be profound implications for economic activity
and international trade. Equation (1) only holds in the short run. Although a carbon tax
would affect both YandM, it would most likely improve the carbon intensity of the economy
M/Y. That implies that a Leviathan tax, if imposed, would increase the Leviathan tax. The
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carbon intensity tends to fall over time also with climate policy. The results shown below do
not correct for this, and are therefore lower bounds of the true Leviathan tax.
Data are readily available. I used the World Bank’s Development Indicators,1 which is
freely available and contains data on all elements of Eq. (1). Economic data are in constant
2,000 US dollars, using market-exchange rates. Carbon dioxide emissions are for fossil fuel
combustion and cement production only. I used data for 2005, the most recent year with
almost complete coverage.
The data used here, data for other years, and additional visualization can be found at:
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/rt220/Leviathan.html
3 Results
Figure 1 shows the survival function of total carbon dioxide emissions in the carbon tax.
Figure 1 should be read as follows. If the carbon tax is zero, all countries meet the criterion
that the carbon tax is less than the Leviathan carbon tax. The (zero) carbon tax covers 26
billion tonnes of carbon dioxide.2 As the carbon tax increases, it exceeds the Leviathan
carbon tax for an increasing number of countries. These countries drop out, and the carbon
tax covers an ever smaller share of the 26 GtCO2.
Table 1 shows the Leviathan tax, tax revenue, carbon intensity, and carbon dioxide
emissions for the 20 largest emitters, together covering 85 % of global emissions.
The numbers in Fig. 1 and Table 1 are intriguing. The Leviathan carbon tax is less than
$1/tCO2 for Liberia and Nigeria. Both countries collect less than 1 % of GDP in taxes. The
Leviathan carbon tax for the Ukraine is $23/tCO2, primarily because its economy is so
carbon-intensive. Iran has the same tax; its carbon-intensity is much lower, but so is its tax
revenue. The Leviathan carbon tax for China is $29/tCO2, as its tax take is relatively low and
its carbon-intensity relatively high. The Leviathan carbon tax is $36/tCO2 for Russia and
$45/tCO2 for India.
For Brazil, the Leviathan tax is $353/tCO2 as its economy is relatively carbon-extensive—
recall that land use emissions are excluded. That tax covers only 14 % of emissions, however.
The median of the Leviathan tax is $200/tCO2—close to the Leviathan carbon tax of
Hungary (just below) and Canada (just above). The Leviathan carbon tax of the USA is
$223/tCO2—at the 75 percentile.
The United Kingdom is the country in the top 20 with the highest Leviathan tax, at $855/
tCO2. UK tax revenues are relatively high and its economy is relatively carbon-extensive.
The four countries of Scandinavia are all in the top 5, together with Macau. Scandinavia
combines high taxes with a high penetration of renewables. Iceland’s Leviathan carbon tax is
the highest, at $1,367/tCO2.
Figure 2 relates the Leviathan carbon tax to the carbon intensity of the economy (left
panel) and to the tax take (right panel). Both are important, but carbon intensity is the main
driver of the results. A carbon tax would have a greater impact on the fiscal system in
countries that collect little tax. A carbon tax would pose a higher short-term burden on a
more carbon-intensive economy.
Figure 3 shows the same information, but now as an inverted supply curve. Three price
levels are shown. (Clarke et al. 2009) synthesize the results of a model comparison exercise
1 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
2 These are the total emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion and cement production in 2005
for the 123 countries for which data are available on emissions, GDP, and tax revenue.
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on the costs of greenhouse gas emission reduction, focusing on ambitious stabilization
targets. Following (Tavoni and Tol 2010), I fit a regression model to the results for the
carbon tax in the near-term. This accounts for the missing observations. The fitted model is
InðTÞ ¼ 11:8 1:0ð Þ þ 0:909 0:213ð ÞP þ 0:577 0:255ð ÞE  0:0163 0:0020ð ÞL ð2Þ
Table 1 Leviathan tax, tax revenue, carbon intensity, and carbon dioxide emissions for the 20 largest
emitters, all in 2005
Leviathan tax Tax revenue Carbon intensity Carbon dioxide emissions
$/tCO2 (% GDP) (kg CO2/$) (mln t CO2/yr)
Iran 23 7.9 3.34 459
Ukraine 23 17.1 6.28 339
China 29 8.7 2.76 5,790
Russia 36 16.6 4.06 1,616
India 45 9.9 2.08 1,411
Indonesia 77 12.5 1.58 336
Thailand 99 17.2 1.62 275
South Africa 106 26.9 2.42 408
Poland 109 16.7 1.39 304
Canada 202 13.8 0.63 563
South Korea 211 14.7 0.68 463
United States 223 11.2 0.48 5,595
Spain 243 12.6 0.49 353
Germany 267 11.1 0.38 810
Australia 330 24.7 0.73 367
Brazil 353 16.7 0.45 350
Japan 450 10.9 0.24 1,238
Italy 522 21.2 0.38 471
France 822 22.4 0.25 392






















































Fig. 1 The survival function
of total carbon dioxide emissions
in the carbon tax in levels
(left axis) and shares (right axis)
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where T is the carbon tax in 2020 required to meet stabilization level L in 2100; after 2020,
the carbon tax increases, roughly at the rate of interest; E is a dummy for scenarios in which
the target level is not exceeded in the interim; and P is a dummy for scenarios with delayed
participation of developing and emerging economies. Numbers between brackets are stan-
dard deviations. There are 78 observations. The adjusted R2 is 52 %.
Equation (2) is based on (Clarke et al. 2009). The estimated parameters imply that, with
all countries participating in climate policy and approaching the target from below, a
stabilization target of 650 ppm CO2 equivalent would require an initial carbon tax of $6/
tCO2e, in all countries, on all emissions, of all gases. A target of 550 ppm CO2e would
require an initial tax of $29/tCO2e, and a 450 ppm target would need an initial $143/tCO2e
tax. These are the three price levels shown in Fig. 3.
If the carbon tax is $6/tCO2e, its revenue would exceed 100 % of total tax revenue in
countries that account for less than0.5 % of total emissions. If the threshold is 10 %, 3.5 % of
emissions would be excluded. In countries representing 73 % of emissions, the carbon tax
would yield less than 1 % of current revenue. This tax and target are feasible from a fiscal
perspective.
The revenue of a $29/tCO2e carbon tax would exceed 100 % of total tax revenue in
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Fig. 3 The survival function
of the total tax revenue for
three alternative carbon taxes
(corresponding to three
alternative stabilization targets
for greenhouse gas concentrations)
in the share of total carbon
dioxide emissions
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almost 21 % of emissions would be out of reach. Equation (2) has that the carbon tax would
then need to be raised to some $72/tCO2e to maintain the same target—but this would
exclude countries with another 7 % of emissions. The carbon tax revenue is greater than 1 %
of total revenue in all countries.
For $143/tCO2e, the carbon tax revenue is greater than 100 % of tax revenue for more than
10% of emissions; and greater than 10% for all countries. Such a carbon taxmay not be fiscally
prudent in many economies. $143/tCO2e is the tax needed to meet the 450 ppm CO2e target,
which roughly corresponds with the 2 °C target of the EU and UN (den Elzen et al. 2007).
4 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, I consider climate policy from a different angle, comparing the revenue of a
hypothetical carbon tax to the total tax revenue of a country. I find that a simple rule—total
tax take should not increase—excludes a small number of countries from a modest climate
policy, but a more substantial number if climate policy aims for the nominal targets of the
European Union and the United Nations. If the rule is stricter—the tax base should be
diversified—ambitious targets cannot be achieved.
The analysis presented here is straightforward, using readily available data. It may be
better to consider total government income rather than total tax revenue. This would remove
the extremely low Leviathan taxes in some resource rich countries, but raise the Leviathan
tax in countries where other government income is negative. It may be more instructive to
compare carbon taxes to other indirect taxes only. This would lower Leviathan taxes, as
indirect taxes are a fraction of all taxes. Other greenhouse gases should be added to the
analysis. This would lower Leviathan taxes, as total emissions are greater than carbon
dioxide emissions. More importantly, the analysis is static. A dynamic analysis would be
more informative, but require three additional elements, viz., scenarios of future carbon
intensities, the impact of emission pricing on carbon intensities, and scenarios of total tax
revenues. Such scenarios are available but disputed. Because the carbon-intensity of econ-
omies tend to fall over time, and more rapidly so in more carbon-intensive economies
(Liddle 2010; Romero-Avila 2008), the problems identified for 2005 should be less pro-
nounced in the future. The analysis disregards distributional issues. Energy is a necessary
good, and carbon taxes fall more heavily on the poor (Rausch et al. 2010). It may be that a
particular carbon tax is acceptable at the country average, but unacceptable from a social
justice perspective. These issues are deferred to future research.
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